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AmERICAN Legal Realism has long been, and perhaps still is, a stumbling
block to European jurists and legal philosophers. This is not necessarily an
indication of provincialism on either side of the Atlantic. The "normative"
conception of law is too deeply embedded in the Continental mind to make
room for a conception of law as a process of decisions. So is the notion of
sovereignty as an exclusive attribute of the legislative. So, above all, is the
conviction that certainty is the essential, and indeed the most precious, of all
legal values. If the tenets of American Realism were generally looked upon
with distrust in Europe, this is due not only to the fact that they refer to and
are derived from a different legal experience. It is also because an essentially
pragmatic approach to the law is not easily reconcilable with a tradition of
legal thinking which is predominantly systematic and rational.
The publication of Felix Cohen's selected papers should contribute, I think,
to lessen that suspicion. Cohen was still in his prime when he embraced with
youthful enthusiasm the most challenging doctrines of Realism. His brilliant
attack on "traditional legal thought-ways" shows all the exuberance of youth:
the very title of one of his best-known essays is deliberately provocative.
Realism (or, as he preferred to rechristen it, Functionalism) represented to
his eyes "an assault upon all dogmas and devices that cannot be translated
into terms of actual experience."' It should have put an end, once and for all,
to the "transcendental nonsense" of traditional jurisprudence, "re-directng"
the study of law into entirely different--empirical, operational-channels.
Writing in the middle Thirties, Cohen saw in the use of the functional method
the most significant advance of modem philosophy. "The attack upon trans-
cendental conceptions of God, matter, the Absolute, essence and accident, sub-
stance and attribute, has been vigorously pressed by C.S. Peirce, James,
Dewey, Russell, Whitehead, C.T. Lewis, C.D. Broad, and most recently by
the Viennese school, primarily by Wittgenstein and Camap. ' ' 2 A similar ad-
vance in jurisprudence could be achieved by taking the lead from Holmes'
redefinition of legal concepts in terms of judicial decisions.
Functionalism as a method may be summed up in the directive: If you
want to understand something, observe it in action.
Applied within the field of law itself, this approach leads to a definition
of legal concepts, rules, and institutions in terms of judicial decisions or
1. P. 47.
2. P. 51.
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other acts of State-force. Whatever cannot be so translated is functionally
meaningless. Applied to the larger field of human behavior, this same
approach leads to an appraisal of law in terms of conduct of human be-
ings who are affected by law. In the former field, the outcome of the
functional approach is generally designated as "realistic jurisprudence."
In the latter field, the outcome of the functional approach is usually called
"sociological jurisprudence." There is, however, no well-recognized defi-
nition of these schools of thought, and I think it is fair to say that "realis-
tic" and "sociological" jurisprudence are in part complementary and in
part overlapping, but in no way antithetical, and that both spring from a
common skeptical, scientific, anti-supernatural, functional outlook.3
Thus, in Cohen's presentation of Realism, what had started essentially as
a revolt against imported ways of thinking about law and as an attempt to
replace them with others more in keeping with American realities, was now
raised to the dignity of a brand-new and original legal philosophy. Indeed,
Cohen's words read much more like a program than like an assessment. This
program, alas, he was prevented from carrying out in detail. But his Nachlass
is rich enough to indicate some of the new perspectives which his eye had
perceived. Even in their bare outline, they constitute a remarkable enrichment
and broadening of the conventional realistic approach. They are, in fact, a
startling anticipation of some of the problems with which legal philosophy is
more directly concerned today.
To begin with, I think that a very special significance should be attributed
to Cohen's particularly cautious attitude towards some of the Realists' most
extreme views, such as their denial of "certainty" in law and what Herbert
Hart has recently called, very appropriately, their "rule-skepticism." Cohen
saw very clearly what it took Llewellyn twenty years to admit: that there
are rules of procedure as well as rules of competence behind the decisions of
judges, rules which must be taken into account not only because without them
"all legal decisions would be simply noises," but also as an indication of the
existence of a "system of governmental controls" and as the basis for "certain
predictable uniformities of official behavior. ' 4 Indeed, Cohen went even fur-
ther in his concessions to "normativism." He clearly saw the peril of "break-
ing down rules and concepts into atomic decisions." He insisted that "the
human demand for security" is the ground for legal protection. Against
Jerome Frank's indiscriminate attack upon the "myth of certainty," he pointed
out, in words that ring almost as a warning, that "civilization rests upon a
vast, intricate complex of expectations and prophecies, and only the predict-
able behavior of those bodies to which society has entrusted its collectivized
physical force can put iron into that scaffolding of hopes and reliances."' '
Next to his rehabilitation of certainty I would list, as one of the most in-
teresting and personal characteristics of Cohen's legal philosophy, his deep






of the present collection chosen the title Logic, Law, and Ethics for the first
group of essays which form almost half of the book. The references to logic
are as frequent here as they are in the larger and more ambitious volume,
Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals (where indeed there can be found an at-
tempt at even using "the chaste language of symbolic logic"). I must leave it
to more competent judges than I am to assess the value of Cohen's contribu-
tion on this score. What I am interested in are the implications of the ques-
tion which Cohen seems to have had in mind in stressing the use of logic for
legal theory. This is the question that crops up both in these essays and in the
introduction to Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy: "Can we
devise translation formulae that will permit men to speak to each other across
all the gulfs of creed and to understand each other through all the curtains of
dogma ?" If logic is to provide us with such formulae of translation, "through
which a statement, true in our system, may be translated into a statement in
another system that sounds quite different but that means the same thing,"6
might not juristic logic bring us back, in the end, to those abstract, ever-valid
concepts and rules of the jurisprudentia universalis which "functionalism"
claimed to have discarded? This would be more in keeping with Coke's view,
that "reason is the life of the law," than with Holmes' opinion, that the life
of the law is experience, not logic.
Certainty and universality are not the only traditional values which we find,
albeit indirectly, restored in Cohen's approach to law and its problems. The
most deliberate, as well as the best known restoration was that of "ethical
criticism" in legal theory. Here again, Cohen was parting company with his
fellow-Realists." Contemporary 'realists'"-he wrote--"have, in general, either
denied absolutely that absolute standards of importance can exist, or else in-
sisted that we must thoroughly understand the facts as they are before we
begin to evaluate them. Such a postponement of the problem of values is equi-
valent to its repudiation."'7 So important did this restoration appear to Cohen
that he devoted his finest efforts to it. The outcome was a remarkable book,
Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals. It is a book that still has much to teach to
the modern reader. Together with its brief and lucid restatement now included
in this volume," it seems to me particularly topical in our present-day con-
troversy between "natural law" and "legal positivism." Contemporary ad-
vocates of natural law might rejoice in finding Cohen deliberately upholding
the case for some discoverable standard of legal valuation. But legal positivists
might equally rejoice in finding him laying down the basic principle that "law
is law, whether it be good or bad, and [that] only on the admission of this
platitude can a meaningful discussion of the goodness and badness of law
rest." Personally, I am unable to see why even the most obdurate positivist
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of law. To conceive of law as primarily a rule or a body of rules should not
prevent us from asking what the rules are about and what effects they have
upon human lives. As Bentham emphasized, "expository" is by no means a
substitute for "censorial" jurisprudence. All the "normativist" would do (and
I think he would do so whether he inclines to natural law or to legal posi-
tivism) would be to suggest a slight, but important correction to the phrase
which Cohen chose for his title. The proper description for the kind of re-
search which Cohen advocated would be, not: Ethical Systems and Legal
Ideals, but: Ethical Ideals and Legal Systems.
In concluding this review I am deeply aware that I have not done Cohen's
essays full justice. There is so much else besides the niceties of legal philoso-
phy in these pages. There emerges from them the picture of a man highly
intelligent and sensitive, immensely cultivated, profoundly sincere and thor-
oughly dedicated to an ideal of social justice-to what he himself called "a
new integration of human interests." The picture is so vivid that, although we
never met, I felt in closing the book as if I had known Cohen personally. I
cannot say how much I regret not having had that good fortune.
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